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Abstract: This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a 
country-level panel from 1960-2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government 
intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes 
and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes 
demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data 
in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely 
more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on 
the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas 
democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) 
that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per 
se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on 
government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead 
survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that 
enhance the productivity of the whole economy. 
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1.  Introduction 
Governing authorities can affect the distribution of income through a wide range of policy 
instruments, but most directly through implemented fiscal redistribution - i.e., taxes collected from 
households and cash transfers distributed to them. Since the political system is a crucial 
determinant of every governmental policy, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies 
have investigated the interplay between political institutions and fiscal redistribution (Boix, 2003; 
Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).  
According to a strand of the theoretical literature, political institutions that concentrate 
political power within a narrow segment of the population (i.e., non-democratic regimes) 
redistribute less, while an expansion of democracy should increase redistribution and produce 
more egalitarian outcomes (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).1 Another strand of the 
theoretical literature investigates the impact of political institutions on the allocation of 
government budget between public goods and cash transfers (see, McGuire and Olson, 1996; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Deacon, 2009). According to these 
studies, democracies favour spending on public goods such as in health and education, whereas 
dictatorships favour spending on cash transfers targeted to politically influential groups.2  
Starting with Lindert (1994), a number of empirical studies have examined the effect of 
political institutions on the size and composition of government spending and taxation. 
Interestingly, the empirical evidence concerning the effect on taxation appears to be mixed. 
Specifically, Mulligan et al., (2004) and Profeta et al., (2013) fail to provide evidence in favour of 
a clear-cut link between political institutions and the size and composition of taxes, whereas 
Acemoglu et al., (2015) suggest a positive and robust impact of democracy on the size of tax 
revenues. Moreover, according to historical studies, the extension of the voting franchise in 
Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries affected taxation but in much more 
                                                 
1 The driving force of this result is highlighted by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981). According to 
their rationale, the lower the income of the median voter relative to the average income, the higher the demand for fiscal 
redistribution. Therefore, since in democracy the voting franchise is extended to poorer segments of the population, thus increasing 
the distance between the median and the mean income, the demand for redistribution increases.  
2 The intuition behind this theoretical result is as follows. In non-democratic regimes in which political power is more concentrated, 
the rational leader will spend the public budget mainly on transfers targeted to critically supporting groups. Spending on a non-
exclusive public good does not make sense, since their benefits can spillover to non-influential outsiders. In contrast, in 
democracies, the electorate (and the required winning coalition) increases, making spending on public goods a more attractive 
option due to the economies of scale inherent in providing public goods to large groups (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Deacon, 2009; 
North et al., 2009). For an excellent review of this literature, see Deacon and Saha (2006).  
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complex and intriguing ways than is often assumed (Aidt and Jensen, 2009a; 2009b; 2013).3 A 
clearer pattern around this period appears in the relationship between democracy and government 
spending that seems to be positive, primarily driven by increased spending on infrastructure and 
internal security, since social programs until the 1930s played only a marginal role in most 
countries (see Lindert, 1994; Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2013). Regarding studies that use 
modern data, expansion of democracy seems to exert a robust positive impact on the provision of 
public goods (see, e.g., Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Ansell, 2010).4 With respect to 
welfare spending, the effect of political institutions is ambiguous. In particular, according to Boix 
(2003), democracy is associated with higher subsidies and transfers, though this linkage is 
conditional on the level of development. In contrast, Mulligan et al., (2010) provide evidence that 
non-democratic regimes spend more of their GDP on social security and redistribute more income 
through payroll taxation.5 Similarly, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) show that democracy 
is positively correlated with social spending in a sample of 14 Latin American countries. Table 1 
provides a concise overview of the papers discussed in this paragraph that have tested the effect of 
democracy on fiscal policy.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Obviously, both the theoretical and the empirical literature conclude that linking fiscal 
policy choices to variations in political institutions is a complicated research issue. In our case, the 
attempt to investigate the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution is even more 
ambitious. This is because political institutions influence many different aspects of the 
implemented fiscal policy, which in turn affects income inequality through a variety of alternative 
channels.6 Our first contribution that distinguishes our analysis from the rest of the literature is that 
                                                 
3 More precisely, Aidt and Jensen (2009a; 2013) provide evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between suffrage extension and 
taxation (retrenchment hypothesis), whereas Aidt and Jensen (2009b) suggest that the effect of franchise extension on the tax 
structure is conditional on the tax collection cost.  
4 A related literature provides evidence for a robust positive effect of democracy on health and education outcomes (see Baum and 
Lake, 2001; 2003; Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Gallego, 2010). Contrary to these findings, Ross (2006) suggests that although 
democracies spend more money on education and health than non-democracies do, such spending does not reduce infant and child 
mortality, since these benefits are mostly directed to middle- and upper-income groups.  
5 Mulligan et al. (2010) mostly highlight the importance of economic and demographic factors on social security policies, providing 
only weak evidence for the effect of political institutions. However, they suggest that, if there is any observed difference between 
democracies and non-democracies, it is that the latter spend a little more of their GDP on social security, and moreover they 
redistribute more (through payroll taxes) to lower income groups. 
6 It should be noted that the empirical literature fails to provide any straightforward association between an expansion of democracy 
and income inequality (see Li et al., 1998; Scheve and Stasavage, 2009; Timmons, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Knutsen, 2015). 
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we capture the extent of fiscal redistribution through an outcome variable. Specifically, we employ 
a measure of “effective fiscal redistribution” calculated as the difference between Gini coefficients 
before and after taxes and transfers.7 We obtain our data from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2009), which provides market and net Gini indices for the 
broadest possible sample of countries and years. It is worth noting that researchers have applied a 
similar measure of fiscal redistribution in the past, though they address different research questions 
(see, e.g., Milanovic, 2000; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Grundler and Kollner, 2017). Using a panel 
of countries from 1960 to 2010, we provide strong evidence that dictatorial regimes redistribute 
more than democracies through taxes and cash transfers. This result remains robust to alternative 
codings of political regimes, across several different specifications and estimation techniques. 
Among our robustness checks, we present Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates that rely on 
the theory of “regional democratisation in waves” developed by Huntington (1993). 
Our second contribution in the literature is that we use data on the size and composition of 
the public sector in an attempt to uncover the channels through which political institutions affect 
effective fiscal redistribution. The merit of this strategy is that we can provide some insights for 
the contradicting findings in the existing literature. Interestingly, we do not find any association 
between political institutions and taxation. Nevertheless, democratic institutions are positively 
associated with health and education expenses, whereas non-democratic regimes rely more heavily 
on cash transfers. These results are consistent with our findings on effective fiscal redistribution. 
On the one hand, dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers, with a direct impact on 
net inequality (after taxes and transfers), the difference between market and net inequality, and 
consequently the level of effective fiscal redistribution. On the other hand, democratic regimes 
favour the provision of public inputs, with the potential to affect market income inequality, but not 
the difference between market and net inequality per se. 
These results are in accordance with a strand of the theoretical literature which suggests 
that democracies and dictatorships actually follow different patterns of government spending 
(McGuire and Olson, 1996; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Deacon, 
2009). According to Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996), a crucial factor that drives this 
difference is that democratic leaders are in need of a majority of voters that earns a significant 
                                                 
7 Although a large number of fiscal policy choices such as spending on health and education may affect Gini coefficients, the fiscal 
instruments that, by definition, affect the difference between market Gini and net Gini are taxes and the cash transfers that mediate 
between market income distribution and net income distribution. 
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share of the market income of the economy. This inevitably leads democratic governments to care 
more for the private market and thus to spend more on public inputs that enhance the productivity 
of the whole economy.8 In other words, the interest of voters in their market earnings induce 
democratic leaders to follow a different pattern of government spending, thus providing more 
public inputs (such as education and health) and less private benefits (such as targeted cash 
transfers) compared to the leaders in autocratic regimes. In the latter case, spending on targeted 
transfers can be a more attractive way to gain political support, since rulers are in need of a 
narrower group of supporters. In line with the above theoretical rationale, our analysis provides 
evidence that democratic regimes care more for human capital that enhances the productivity of 
the whole economy (see, e.g., Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). On the contrary, non-democratic 
regimes rely more heavily on market regulation that generates a wide range of privileged private 
goods (such as business licences, privileged access to credit, etc.) and prospects for rent-seeking 
activities (see, e.g., De Haan and Sturm, 2003; Giuliano et al., 2010).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
econometric methodology and presents the empirical findings on effective fiscal redistribution. 
Section 3 attempts to illuminate the fiscal policy channels that drive our results and provides some 
case-study evidence to illustrate these channels. Section 4 discusses how the political institutions 
affect the priorities of survival-oriented leaders concerning the provision of private versus public 
goods and provides empirical evidence in support of these theoretical considerations. In Section 5, 
we summarize and conclude. 
 
2. Political institutions and fiscal redistribution 
2.1 Data 
Since fiscal redistribution through taxes and transfers is in the centre of our attention, we should 
first of all clarify how we measure the size of this governmental policy. Our preferred measure is 
calculated by taking the difference between the Gini of incomes before (market Gini) and after 
                                                 
8 It must be noted that this view for democracies cannot be taken as a panacea. There are numerous historical examples of 
dictatorships that followed pro-market policies, such as the dictator Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Chung Hee Park and Doo-Hwan 
Chan in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek and his son in Taiwan, and Deng Xiaoping in China. Moreover, Olson (1982) suggests that, 
in many cases, democratically elected governments (mostly in mature democratic regimes) are not characterized by a high 
encompassing interest for the private economy due to the increased political influence of specific interest groups, lobbies, and 
cartels. Following a similar rationale, De Luca et al., (2015) show that capital-rich dictators follow policies that generate higher 
growth rates than the ones obtained under democracy. 
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(net Gini) taxes and transfers (see, e.g., Milanovic, 2000; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Grundler and 
Kollner, 2017): 
 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡      (1) 
 
The Gini indices range between 0 and 100, where higher values indicate a more unequal income 
distribution. When the difference in equation (1) is positive taxes and cash transfers reduce income 
inequality, and as this difference increases effective fiscal redistribution in country i at time t is 
higher.  
Our data are obtained by the SWIID. The main advantage of this database is that it 
incorporates Atkinson and Brandolini’s (2001) recommendations to provide the most comparable 
market and net Gini indices for the broadest possible sample of countries and years- namely 174 
countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to 2013. To achieve this goal, the SWIID 
employs market and net Ginis from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) as a benchmark of most 
reliable data to which inequality estimates from other sources are standardized. Observations from 
these sources are harmonized through a multiple-imputation algorithm that estimates country-
years not yet covered in the LIS.9 To minimize reliance on problematic assumptions, the custom 
missing-data algorithm uses as much information as possible from proximate years within the same 
country. A precise description of the procedure with detailed documentation of the number of 
countries for which adjustments vary can be found in Solt (2015, 2016). The coverage of country-
years in the SWIID far exceeds those of alternative cross-national inequality datasets, making it 
an appealing choice for studies based on broad panel estimation (see, e.g., Ostry et al., 2014; 
Acemoglu et. al., 2015; Brueckner et al., 2015; De Haan and Sturm, 2015). Nevertheless, SWIID 
has recently been subject to some criticism concerning the reliability of the imputation technique, 
especially for less developed countries that few and less reliable baseline observations are available 
(see Jenkins 2015). In this regard, our empirical strategy and extensive robustness checks treat the 
data with special care in order to establish the reliability of our estimates.  
                                                 
9 In the earlier SWIID versions, Solt (2009) used the World Income Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER, 2014, henceforth WIID) 
as the only source for the imputations. However, version 5.0 utilizes over ten thousand Gini coefficients adding the OECD Income 
Distribution Database, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean Center generated by CEDLAS and the 
World Bank, Eurostat, the World Bank's PovcalNet, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the 




For the main explanatory variable of our study, we use data from three alternative sources 
that allow us to distinguish democratic from dictatorial regimes. First, we employ the dichotomous 
variable developed by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010, henceforth CGV) that covers 202 
countries over the period 1946 to 2008. The key political factors CGV takes into account in order 
to codify a period as democratic are: (i) popular elections of the executive and legislature; (ii) 
multiple parties competing in the election; and (iii) unconsolidated incumbent advantage. Second, 
we use the dichotomous measure developed by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013, henceforth BMR) 
that provides information for 219 distinct countries from 1800 to 2007. The BMR dichotomous 
measure qualifies a country as democratic if - in addition to the factors that were taken into account 
by CGV- at least half of the male electorate is enfranchised.10 In both cases, the variable 
dictatorship takes the value of 1 when a country is categorized as non-democratic, and 0 otherwise. 
Third, we rely on the continuous measure POLITY2 as obtained from the Polity IV database 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). This index has been applied as a tool to classify political regimes in 
a number of studies (see, e.g., Mulligan et al., 2004; Haber and Menaldo, 2011), though a closer 
look suggests that it mainly focuses on the institutional side of political competition (see, 
Vanhanen, 2000). However, it offers the advantage of varying from -10 (extreme autocracy) to 
+10 (perfect democracy), thus providing more within-country variation in the sample. For 
consistency with the other two measures, the POLITY2 index is reversed and normalised to run 
from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating more authoritarianism.  
Finally, in all regressions we add a number of covariates that are expected to affect fiscal 
redistribution. In particular, we control for the level of economic development by employing the 
log of real GDP per capita (denoted as GDP per capita) obtained from the Penn World Tables. 
According to Wagner’s law (Wagner, 1883), we expect richer countries to have larger public 
sectors, which in turn can affect the design of fiscal policy and fiscal redistribution. Moreover, 
given that a number of studies have shown a direct effect of democratisation on economic 
development (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2018), controlling for GDP 
per capita reduces the potential omitted variable bias in our empirical specification. Our next 
control variable is the dependency ratio of the population (denoted as age dependency). It is 
measured as the percentage of the population younger than 15 years or older than 64 to the working 
                                                 
10 Both, the CGV and the BMR datasets, are different updates and revisions of the well-established dichotomous classification of 
regimes introduced by Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000). 
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age population. According to the literature, demographic factors consist a basic driving force for 
the extent of social benefits and public pensions (Lindert, 1994; Mulligan et al., 2004; Mulligan et 
al., 2010). Finally, our analysis takes into account the effect of international market integration by 
including the percentage of imports plus exports to GDP (denoted as openness). It is well 
established in the literature that the demand for spending, especially for income transfer programs, 
varies positively with the degree of globalization as a safety net against the exposure to the terms 
of trade risk (see, e.g., Rodrik, 1998). Data on age dependency and openness are obtained from 
World Banks’ World Development Indicators (WDI).11 
Our dataset comprises of 146 countries from 1960 through to 2010, though not all variables 
are available for all countries in all periods.12 Table A1 in Appendix A provides definitions, data 
sources and descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. Moreover, Table B1 in the 
Online Appendix provides the full list of countries with information for regime changes according 
to the CGV and BMR variables, as well as minimum and maximum values of the continuous index 
POLITY2.  
 
2.2 Empirical strategy 
To analyse the influence of political institutions on fiscal redistribution, we formulate the 
following empirical model: 
 
     𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (2)                           
                  
The dependent variable is our measure of effective fiscal redistributionit in country i at time t. The 
main variable of interest dictatorshipit-1, classifies the political regime in country i at time t-1, 
according to the CGV, BMR, and POLITY2 variables described above. Moreover, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 includes 
the additional covariates of the regression. Finally, and correspond to country and time fixed 
effects, respectively, and  is the error term. In this specification years t-1 and t represent the 
first and last observations, respectively, of each subperiod (1960-65 to 2006-10) of our sample. 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that we have attempted to include in our model a series of other variables, such as the population and the 
urbanization rate. However, none of these variables had a significant effect on fiscal redistribution, and due to other concerns 
(correlation of covariates, reduction of sample size) we do not include them in our estimations. 






We adopt this strategy for three reasons. First, because we expect the effect of a change in the 
political regime not to be contemporaneous (see, Acemoglu et. al., 2015).13 Second, we attempt to 
reduce reverse causation from fiscal redistribution to dictatorship. Third, we aim to mitigate, to 
the degree possible, reliance on the data imputation technique applied by Solt (2009), who 
estimates missing country-year observations from proximate years within the same country. 
Equation (2) guarantees that our estimates are not contaminated by aggregate shocks and trends 
common to all countries or time-invariant local factors including geography, history and social 
norms. 
However, due to the persistence in inequality and fiscal commitments that carry over from 
one year to the next, our model could be dynamic. Following the rationale of the relevant literature 
(see, e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 2013; Amendola et al., 2013), we include a lagged dependent variable 
in our model estimating the following equation: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎1𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (3) 
 
To estimate equation (3), we cannot rely on a dynamic Fixed Effects (FE) model, since the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the estimated equation introduces 
a potential bias by not satisfying the strict exogeneity assumption of the error term εit. As shown 
in the literature, the estimated bias of this formulation is of order 1/T, where T is the time length 
of the panel, even as the number of countries becomes large (see, among others, Nickell, 1981; 
Kiviet, 1995). To address this issue, we rely on the generalized method of moments (GMM) for 
dynamic panel models, as proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). 
This econometric technique removes fixed effects using either first-differencing or forward 
orthogonal deviations. In our case, we apply the forward orthogonal deviations as proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) as follows: 
 ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎1∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2∆𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝛿𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡      (4) 
 
                                                 
13 It should be stressed that alternative empirical strategies, where the variable dictatorship and/or the controls are entered 
contemporaneously in the specification, produce the same qualitative results to those discussed in Subsection 2.3.  
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This transformation method essentially subtracts the mean of future observations available in the 
sample from the first observations, and its main advantage is that it preserves the sample size in 
panels with gaps. Although the model given by equation (4) solves some major econometric 
problems, it introduces a correlation between the new error term and the lagged dependent variable. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the use of lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels 
as instruments.14 To this end, our lagged endogenous regressor is instrumented with second and 
further lags of the dependent variable, whereas all the other covariates are considered as 
exogenous.  
Our empirical strategy rules out certain types of contaminating factors for our results, 
though it does not resolve endogeneity concerns. For this reason, in Subsection 2.4.3 we take an 
instrumental variables approach. The challenge in our case is to find an external instrument that 
affects fiscal redistribution only through its effect in the political regime. Along these lines, we 
consider regional democratic diffusion as an attractive source of exogenous variation for the 
determination of the domestic political regime (see, Huntington, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 
2009). Finally, it should be noted that in all models throughout our analysis reported standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. 
 
2.3 Baseline results 
Our first results are reported in Table 2. In columns (1) to (3) we report the estimates of equation 
(2) where the variable fiscal redistribution is regressed on one of the three alternative measures of 
dictatorship, as well as on the additional covariates. As can be seen, in all cases the main variable 
of interest is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level highlighting that non-democratic 
regimes redistribute more income through taxes and transfers. The rest of the covariates are 
positive and statistically significant - consistent with our theoretical priors.  
 
[Insert Table 2, here] 
 
                                                 
14 An alternative to the difference-GMM is the Blundell and Bond’s (2000) system-GMM estimator, which maintains the 
differenced equation adding an equation in levels with another set of instruments. We prefer the difference over the system-GMM 
estimator for two reasons. First and foremost, the additional identification assumption required by the system-GMM, namely that 
fiscal redistribution is uncorrelated with time-invariant country characteristics is untestable and may be difficult to defend raising 
instrument validity concerns (see also Acemoglu et al., 2015). Second, related to the first point, recent research has challenged the 
perceived superiority of system-GMM in contexts with weak internal instruments. Bun and Windmeijer (2010) find that system-
GMM may not be as robust to weak instrument bias as previously thought. 
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Moving one step forward, in columns (4) to (9) of Table 2 we add the lagged dependent 
variable into the set of controls. In columns (5), (7) and (9), we use the GMM estimator as 
described in equation (4), whereas in columns (4), (6) and (8) we report the dynamic FE estimates 
for comparison reasons. The first thing to notice is that the lagged dependent variable enters in all 
regressions with a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Moreover, its coefficient in the 
GMM estimates is higher to those obtained in the FE specifications as expected. The main variable 
of interest, dictatorship, remains positive and statistically significant, whereas from the additional 
covariates only age dependency retains its significant effect on fiscal redistribution. The 
consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption of no serial 
correlation in the error term (i.e., no second-order autocorrelation in the differenced idiosyncratic 
errors) and on the validity of the instruments. The Arellano-Bond test indicates that there is no 
second-order serial correlation among the differenced residuals, and the Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions suggests that our instruments are valid.  
Concerning the magnitude of the long-run effect of the variable dictatorship, according to 
the static specification of Table 2, this lies between 1.3 and 2.54 points. To obtain the long-run 
effect in the dynamic specification, the coefficient of the variable dictatorship is divided by (1 −𝛼1), where  𝛼1 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝛼2(1−𝛼1) ). According to the 
GMM estimates, the long-run effect is comparable to the static specification lying between 1.96 
and 2.26 points. Given that the mean value of fiscal redistribution in the sample is 5.19 points 
(with a standard deviation of 5.57), it is clear that this effect is quantitatively sizable.  
 
2.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In this subsection, we report various robustness checks. First, we examine if our estimates are 
contaminated by the most noisy/unreliable inequality data. Second, we add market Gini into the 
set of the control variables, to exclude the possibility that our results are driven by differences in 
gross income inequality between democratic and dictatorial regimes. Third, we take an 
instrumental variables approach in order to alleviate concerns of endogeneity in our estimates.  
 
2.4.1 Outliers and income inequality estimates 
Despite the popularity of the SWIID among social scientists, an intense discussion has arisen for 
its suitability on cross-country analysis of income inequality (see, Jenkins, 2015). The main 
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critique follows in Atkinson and Brandolini’s (2001; 2009) footsteps, who review the pitfalls 
encountered in the utilization of secondary income inequality datasets. The newest versions of 
SWIID address these pitfalls, though, some issues remain due to the wide country-year coverage 
of the database. In particular, for some estimates the degree of comparability across countries is 
still a concern, since different sources may apply different methodologies to compute the degree 
of inequality. However, given that our regressions include country fixed effects, the across-country 
comparability should not be a major concern. An additional pitfall relates to the incompatibility of 
inequality data within counties over time, especially in less developed countries that few and less 
precise sources are available.15 
For this reason, our empirical strategy, as described in Subsection 2.2, was adjusted to 
incorporate issues related to the custom missing algorithm employed by Solt (2009), whereas in 
this subsection we perform five checks in order to establish the reliability of our estimates. First, 
the SWIID provides estimates of uncertainty for each country-year observation of the income 
inequality data. Therefore, to take into account a large part of the remaining incomparability in the 
data, we drop from our estimates 10 percent of the observations where the variable fiscal 
redistribution is associated with the higher uncertainty.16 Second, we drop from our sample the 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries, because fewer and less precise inequality data are available for the 
construction of the variable fiscal redistribution. Third, following a similar rationale, we also drop 
from our estimates the first two decades of the sample. Fourth, we drop Soviet and Soviet satellite 
countries. Such dictatorships may appear “more redistributive” just on account of the scale of state 
involvement in the economy. An additional concern is that the sharp changes of Gini estimates in 
these countries might reflect to greater extent measurement problems of market inequality, rather 
than realised changes on income inequality. Finally, we rerun our estimates without countries with 
a standardized residual above 1.96 or below -1.96. 
In panels A to E of Table 3, we rerun the static FE and the GMM regressions of Table 2 
for the above robustness checks. To save space, we only report the estimates for the dictatorship 
                                                 
15 A solution according to Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) is to check the robustness using data from alternative sources, as well 
as mentioning the potential drawbacks related to the choice of a specific dataset. Such a source in our case is the WIID that lately 
increased substantially the coverage of market and net Gini indices. However, the increased coverage does not particularly apply 
to developing economies, where a considerable amount of within-country variation in the type of the political regime is observed 
in our sample. 
16 To incorporate the uncertainty of both components of the dependent variable, we aggregate the standard errors of Gini indices to 
construct a standard error estimate for the variable fiscal redistribution. It should be noted though that this strategy has the drawback 
of entailing the strong assumption that the errors of the two Gini indices are independent. 
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coefficient. Once again, the results strongly support our baseline findings, suggesting that 
authoritarianism significantly enhances the scope of redistribution. 
 
[Insert Table 3, here] 
 
2.4.2 Gross income inequality and fiscal redistribution 
Our next robustness check is to add in the set of the control variables the market Gini index. The 
most obvious reasons is that the likelihood of democracy (see, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; 
Dorsch and Maarek, 2015), but also the evolution of fiscal redistribution may depend on income 
inequality levels (see Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Moreover, democracy exerts a positive impact 
on the provision of public goods according to the literature (see, e.g., Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo 2001; Ansell, 2010), which in turn may impact income inequality independently of the 
effect of democracy on these policy instruments. Therefore, by controlling for the market Gini we 
attempt to eliminate a large number of alternative policy channels through which political 
institutions may affect the income distribution.  
 
 [Insert Table 4, here] 
 
As shown in Table 4, the variable dictatorship remains a highly significant and positive 
determinant of fiscal redistribution. In addition, market Gini enters with a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in columns (1) to (3). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) that higher inequality leads to a greater demand for 
redistribution, which translates to an expansion of the welfare system. However, this result 
becomes statistically insignificant in columns (4) to (6) when the lagged dependent variable enters 
in the specification with a positive and statistically significant coefficient.17 Regarding the rest of 
the covariates, once again age dependency bears a positive and statistically coefficient in all 
specifications highlighting the robust effect of demographic factors on fiscal redistribution.   
 
                                                 
17 An additional check is to interact market Gini with the variable dictatorship, in order to examine if the effect of the political 
regime on fiscal redistribution is conditional on the level of income inequality. A concern in our case is that more unequal non-
democratic regimes appear as the most redistributive. However, our estimates- available upon request- indicate that the interaction 
term is negative and statistically insignificant.  
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2.4.3 The 2SLS identification strategy 
Our estimates linking political institutions and fiscal redistribution do not necessarily imply a 
causal relationship. By exploiting within country variation, we control for all time-invariant 
features shaping fiscal redistribution and the type of the political regime. However, we cannot rule 
out the fact that omitted time-varying country characteristics drive the correlation. One could still 
argue that our results can be affected by potential reverse causality running from fiscal 
redistribution to the political regime, or by the measurement error of the alternative regime-type 
variables that we use in our empirical analysis. To alleviate these concerns we pursue an 
instrumental variables strategy. 
The challenge in our case is to find an instrument that is adequately correlated with the 
regime within the country, while it remains uncorrelated with the unobserved time-varying 
component that affects fiscal redistribution. To this end, our strategy relies on the theory of 
“regional democratisation in waves” developed by Huntington (1993), as well as the “foreign 
democratic capital” theory suggested by Persson and Tabellini (2009). In particular, we expect 
regional democratic diffusion in Latin America, Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries during “the third wave” to be an attractive source of exogenous variation in the 
determination of the domestic political regime. To construct our instrument we apply the inverse 
distance weighting formula as follows:  
 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑡𝑗≠𝑖∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖     (5) 
 
where Djt classifies if country j (different from i) is democratic according to the CGV, BMR, and 
POLITY2 variables described above; and Wij is the inverse distance in kilometres between the 
capitals of countries i and j. Our instrument, democracy abroadit, takes values between 0 and 1 
with higher values indicating that country i at time t has more democratic countries in the 
geographic neighbourhood. More importantly, a regional wave of democratisation increases the 
value of democracy abroad, which in turn can be diffused in the domestic political regime (see 
Huntington, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 2009). It is worth noting that Acemoglu et al. (2018) 
have applied a similar strategy in their study to tackle the aforementioned econometric issues, 
whereas Ansell (2010) and Aidt and Jensen (2013), as in our case, add the lagged value of the 
instrumented variable in the vector of instruments.   
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Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 present the baseline 2SLS results, whereas in columns (4) to 
(6) we add in the set of the control variables the market Gini. We abstain from employing a 
dynamic specification, since the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of 
the equation introduces a bias in our estimates (see, e.g., Nickell, 1981). The first-stage results are 
reported in the lower part of Table 5. The coefficient of the variable democracy abroad bears the 
expected negative sign and it is statistically significant in 4 out of 6 regressions. The consistency 
of the 2SLS model requires that the instruments are strong enough and valid to predict the 
endogenous variable dictatorship. For this reason, first we refer to the first stage F-statistics of the 
excluded instruments. According to Staiger and Stock (1997), the first stage F-statistic should be 
at least 10 for weak identification not to be a problem. As can be seen, the first-stage F statistics 
in Table 5 are high enough to guard against the problem of weak instruments. Second, since the 
number of excluded instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables, a Hansen test 
statistic can be calculated to test the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis 
is that the instruments are valid and thus uncorrelated with the error term. In all cases the 
overidentification test does not reject the null hypothesis, highlighting the validity of our 
instruments.  
 
 [Insert Table 5, here] 
 
The second-stage results reported in Table 5 verify once again the positive effect of the 
variable dictatorship on fiscal redistribution. Although our instrumental variables strategy does 
not fully exploit random variation, accounting for the “third wave of democratisation” as an 
external instrument strongly supports our baseline findings. It is not possible to test directly the 
“exclusion restriction”, though it seems reasonable that the primary impact of regional democratic 
diffusion on fiscal redistribution is via the domestic political regime. However, one could still 
argue that the exclusion restriction can be violated if the regime type abroad relates to 
redistribution abroad, and the latter has direct spillover effects on the dependent variable. To 
exclude this possibility, we control in the 2SLS models for redistribution abroad. Our results -
available upon request- are similar to those obtained in Table 5. Another threat is that the impact 
of the regime type on redistribution (via the selection and subsequent implementation of particular 
fiscal policies) to come with substantial time lags, and it may thus be that the exclusion restriction 
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is violated by including this instrument. It should be noted that when we increase the distance 
between regime type and fiscal redistribution from 10 to 20 years, although we lose a significant 
number of observations, the effect of dictatorship remains giving us some confidence for the 
validity of our results. Finally, we observe that the 2SLS coefficients are somewhat higher than in 
our previous specifications. We interpret this as a possible measurement error problem in the right 
hand side endogenous variable, which leads to an attenuation bias in the OLS estimates (see 
Angrist and Krueger, 1999).  
 
3. Fiscal policy channels 
3.1 Political institutions and fiscal policy 
In this subsection, we attempt to illuminate the fiscal policy channels that could be driving our 
puzzling empirical finding. Our fiscal data that reflect the level as well as the composition of fiscal 
policy are obtained from three alternative databases. First, we use data from the ICTD Government 
Revenue Dataset (ICTD). ICTD covers 188 countries over the period 1980-2013, and it has been 
compiled by sources like the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and the IMF Article IV 
Reports. This is a new and high-quality source for internationally comparable disaggregated tax 
data, which provides information at the general government level – when available – allowing 
researchers to avoid the underestimation of revenue collection in federal states (see, Prichard et 
al., 2014). Our second source is the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) project that reports 
measures for the size of the general government every five years since 1970, and annually from 
2000 to 2012 for a maximum of 153 countries. Third, we obtain data from the Global Development 
Network Growth Database (GDNGD), which is a reliable source for disaggregated fiscal revenue 
and expenditure data for 123 countries over the period 1972-2000. Its primary source is GFS, and 
it covers consolidated central government accounts.18 
Regarding our variables on the revenues side, we measure the size of the government using 
the variables total revenues and total tax revenues -from the ICTD and the GDNGD- both scaled 
                                                 
18 Using the ICTD and the EFW, we face an inevitable trade-off between coverage and comparability. In both cases, data before 
1999 are based on the Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) (1986) classification, whereas beyond 1999, the data are 
based on the GFSM (2013) framework. The new accounting practice has been backdated until 1990, though it is difficult to bridge 
the two classifications, since fiscal variables are measured on a cash basis in GFSM (1986) and on an accrual basis in GFSM 
(2013). Therefore, merging the two classifications might involve a number of inaccuracies of unknown magnitude. This is not an 
issue in the GDNGD, which is based entirely on the old accounting technique.  
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by GDP and expressed as percentages.19 Concerning the expenditures side, we use the following 
four variables all expressed as a percentage of GDP. First, we obtain the fiscal variable social 
security and welfare affairs and services (denoted as social services) from the GDNGD. This 
measure includes central government payments, both in cash and in kind, which intend to 
compensate for reduction or loss of income or inadequate earning capacity.20 Second, we employ 
the variable subsidies and transfers from the EFW database that includes in cash and in kind 
subsidies and social benefits of the general government. Third, we apply the variable transfers to 
households and non-profit institutions from GDNGD (denoted as cash transfers).21 This variable 
concerns the central government and has the advantage of including only cash payments. Finally, 
we sum health and education expenditures from the GDNGD in order to construct the variable 
health and education. The aim is to check for changes in the provision of public goods that generate 
in kind services with no direct effect on effective fiscal redistribution.  
In the analysis that follows, we modify equation (2) as follows:   
 𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑡+4 = 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑡+4 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (6) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑡+4 represents a fiscal variable in country i over a five-year period. The variable 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 classifies the political regime at time t, according to the CGV, BMR, and POLITY2 
variables. Moreover, 𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑡+4 is the vector of covariates in country i over a five-year period. Finally, 
and correspond to country and time-fixed effects, respectively, and  is the error term.  
We prefer the specification of equation (6) for two reasons. First and foremost, by using 
fiscal variables on the left side of the estimated equation, we do not face issues related to the 
custom missing algorithm employed by Solt (2009). Therefore, our strategy is to resort to non-
overlapping 5-year averages, which has the advantage of smoothing over some of the cyclical 
features of the fiscal variables (see, e.g., Kneller et al., 1999). Second, given that fiscal data have 
gaps, taking five-year averages instead of one observation from each subperiod allows us to 
maximize the available number of observations. Unfortunately, we cannot apply this strategy with 
                                                 
19 An additional advantage of the ICTD is that it flags the observations that are not credible for international comparisons (for 
details, see pp. 30-32 in Prichard et al., 2014). In light of this information, we exclude these data from the analysis.  
20 For more information regarding the expenditure categories that compose this fiscal variable, see page 46 in the following link: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/1986/eng/pdf/ch4a.pdf  





the variable subsidies and transfers from the EFW database, since it provides one observation 
every five years until 2000. Thus, we opt for using only the last observation of each subperiod 
(1970-75 to 2006-10) of our sample in the estimations. It is worth noting that we do not estimate 
a dynamic specification, because introducing a lagged dependent variable either does not affect 
our results or it reduces our sample significantly.  
The results for the revenue variables are presented in Table 6A. As can be seen, 
dictatorship bears a non-significant coefficient in all alternative specifications. This evidence is 
consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., Mulligan et al., 2004; Scheve and Stasavage, 2012; 
Profeta et al., 2013), though it contradicts conventional theory that an expansion of democracy 
should lead to greater tax revenues and redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).22  
 
 [Insert Table 6A, here] 
 
The results for the composition of spending are reported in Table 6B. As can be seen in 
columns (1)-(6), the variable dictatorship is statistically insignificant. Consequently, our analysis 
fails to provide evidence that the type of political regime is associated with changes in social 
spending that accounts for both cash and in kind transfers. Interestingly, in columns (8) and (9), 
that social spending includes only cash transfers the variable dictatorship is positive and 
statistically significant.23 Moreover, according to the results in columns (10)-(12), the variable 
dictatorship is negatively correlated with health and education expenses. To the best of our 
knowledge, only Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), for a panel of Latin American countries 
over the period 1973-1997, have provided similar evidence regarding the effect of the political 
regime on the composition of public spending. Regarding the positive effect of democratisation on 
health and education, our results are similar to those of important previous studies (see, e.g., 
Lindert, 2004; Ansell, 2010). The effect of non-democratic regimes on cash transfers is consistent 
                                                 
22 For brevity we do not report estimates concerning the relationship between political institutions and the composition of taxes. In 
specifications that we use direct and indirect tax revenues as dependent variables, once again, the variable dictatorship is 
statistically insignificant. This lack of significant results could be attributed to measurement error. This is because the simple 
measures of tax composition cannot capture the complexity of the whole tax system or provide a clear picture of the adopted tax 
policy. More importantly, these measures fail to reflect the redistributive nature of the tax system which is mostly related to the 
specific design of each tax (and the corresponding degree of tax progressivity) rather than the level of each tax category as a share 
of GDP. 
23 A potential issue with these estimates is that the number of observations drops significantly, making more difficult to capture 
within variation of the political regime. However, even in yearly panels, with and without the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable, results remain unaffected. 
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with the cross-sectional analysis of Mulligan et al. (2010), though the results in the literature are 
far from consensus (see, e.g., Boix, 2003; Profeta et al., 2013).  
 
 [Insert Table 6B, here] 
 
Overall, these empirical findings suggest that democracies and dictatorships follow a 
different pattern of spending, which is consistent with the puzzling evidence presented in Tables 
2-5. On the one hand, dictatorial regimes seem to rely on cash transfers, which directly affect net 
inequality (after taxes and transfers), the difference between market and net inequality, and 
consequently the level of effective fiscal redistribution. On the other hand, democratic regimes 
prefer higher provision of public goods with the potential to affect market income inequality, but 
definitely not the difference between market and net inequality or the level of effective fiscal 
redistribution.24  
 
3.2 Case studies 
In this section, we examine a set of case studies that provide useful information about the shape of 
fiscal policy under different political institutions. During the 1970s, a wave of political 
liberalization took place in Southern Europe with Portugal, Spain, and Greece exiting from 
authoritarian military rule. Before the democratic transition, all three countries had extremely low 
levels of education spending by European standards (less than 2 percent of the national income) 
(see Ansell, 2010).  The cases of Spain and Greece are the most characteristic examples concerning 
the political economy forces that may block educational expansion in society. In Spain, education 
until 1970 was under the domain of the Catholic Church, which ran fee-paying schools mostly for 
children of the upper and the upper-middle classes. During that period, Spanish education was 
extremely stratified, with only 3 percent of Spaniards attending secondary school (see McNair, 
1984). Public spending on education increased substantially only after the democratisation and 
especially after the 1978 post-Franco Constitution that enshrined the right to secondary education 
and led to the development of a strong state school system (see Ansell, 2010). This reform did not 
take place during the authoritarian years, mostly because the Catholic Church – a core supporter 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that we performed some ancillary regressions to investigate if health and education is a negative predictor of 
market Gini. We employed the specification in equation (2), and although the coefficient of the variable health and education is 
negative its effect is statistically insignificant.  
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of the Franco’s regime – blocked such an expansion in mass education in several ways.25 However, 
although public spending on education was considerably below its long-run trend under Franco’s 
rule (Diebolt, 1999), public pension spending increased substantially during the same period, 
highlighting the preference of the ruler to large social security budgets (Mulligan et al., 2010).  
Unlike Spain, Greece had an extended period of post-war democratic governments before 
the autocratic interlude of military rule (the so-called “Junta of the Colonels”) from 1967-1974. 
Three years before that dictatorial interval, the democratic government of centre-liberal Prime 
Minister George Papandreou attempted to introduce a modern education bill that would replace 
the artificial state language Katharevousa with the spoken Greek language in primary education. 
This educational reform aimed to increase the accessibility of the poor and the middle class –
potential supporters of the centre-liberal party – to education. At the same time, compulsory 
education was extended to nine years (Kazamias, 1978). As a result of these reforms, public 
spending on education increased from 1.4 percent of national income in 1960 to 2.1 percent of 
national income in 1965 (Ansell, 2010). In 1967, Colonel George Papadopoulos seized control of 
government and established a military junta. The generals revoked the 1964 Educational Act and 
reduced the compulsory education requirement from nine to six years (see Gouvias, 1998). As a 
result of this counter reform, education spending decreased to 1.7 percent of the national income 
until the mid-1970s (see Ansell, 2010). However, compulsory education reverted to nine years, 
and public spending on education increased substantially (2-2.5 percent of national income) after 
the restoration of democracy in 1974.  
Next we place the spotlight on a number of cases in the area of Latin America and 
especially in Brazil. According to a number of studies, authoritarian regimes in this region enacted 
and maintained social policy programs that distributed private benefits (i.e. targeted old-age 
pension programs) to groups of “critical supporters” (i.e. military, white-collar workers, some 
strategically situated blue-collars unions) according to the principles of state corporatism (see e.g., 
Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2018). Some characteristic examples of 
targeted social policy design are the “bureaucratic authoritarian state” in Argentina during its first 
period (1966-1973) and the military regime in Uruguay. In Argentina, the broad social security 
system established by Peron was partly replaced by the bureaucratic authoritarian state, with a 
                                                 
25 It must be noted that a similar reform that would increase the access to education was also attempted by the floundering Franco 
regime in the early 1970s. However, the political bargain between the dictatorial regime and the Catholic Church finally led to very 
little expansion (see O’Malley, 1995 for more details on this). 
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number of programs targeting the core supporters of the regime in the military, police, and civil 
services (see Mesa-Lago, 1978). Similarly, the military regime in Uruguay that came into power 
after 1973 did not implement deep structural changes in the previous social security system, but 
decided to cut budget expenditures and to restrict the generosity of social benefits mostly because 
of the fiscal pressures driven from the oil crisis. During the crisis, the regime allowed inflation to 
reduce the real value of pensions for broad categories of the population, while it took actions to 
support the pensions of a narrow group of agents (see Castiglioni, 2005).  
 For the purposes of our analysis, it is also interesting to investigate how these political 
regimes responded to electoral incentives in a few cases in which some kind of semi-competitive 
elections were allowed. To this end, we place the spotlight on the case of Brazil during the 1970s. 
Brazil’s military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985 attached increasing importance to semi-
competitive legislative elections as a means to weaken the opposition. More precisely, during the 
early 1960s, the authoritarian regime established a “pro-government” party Aliança Renovadora 
Nacional (ARENA) and at the same time encouraged the creation of an official opposition party 
the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) led by “safe” political leaders. In 1971, the regime 
extended non-contributory old-age pensions to peasants and rural indigents. This development 
served the political purpose of pre-empting potential rural unrests, but also reflected specific 
electoral considerations. During the mid ’70s, when more moderate military factions gained the 
control of government, clear-cut electoral motivations led to further expansion of social security 
programs.26 A key feature of this strategy was the creation of strong patronage networks between 
the civilian politicians of the ARENA party and the potential voters in the rural, northeast areas 
(Weyland, 1996). It must be noted that, during the same period, the military regime did make some 
attempts to strengthen the financing of the educational system, but mostly by providing resources 
to the universities (instead of the primary and the secondary education) that were far more 
important for its core supporters (see Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). All in all, these case studies 
provide a view of how political institutions may affect the priorities of survival-oriented leaders 
on the allocation of the government budget.27  
                                                 
26 It is worth noting that, in the congressional elections that took place in 1974, MDB made a surprising show of political strength 
that threatened the political survival of the pro-government ARENA party, leading to substantial changes in the implemented 
policy. 
27 The cases of Poland and Hungary during the 1990s also present a number of interesting characteristics which are in line with our 
results. During the phase of democratic transition, national governments in both countries employed rather radical reforms to their 
social security systems by giving priority to the pension system. The general idea of the implemented reform was the drastic 




4. Political institutions and private vs. public goods 
4.1 Theoretical considerations 
Motivated by the empirical and anecdotal evidence above, our final step in this study is to provide 
a theoretical connection between political institutions and the composition of government spending 
that is essential for the scope of redistribution. Following Olson (1993; 2000) and McGuire and 
Olson (1996), we argue that the encompassing interest of the ruler, for the productivity of the 
economy, is a crucial factor in explaining the different patterns of spending between dictatorships 
and democracies. According to this rationale, when authorities encompass the interest of the 
society as a whole, they direct a larger amount of revenues to public inputs (health and education), 
since the latter, through increases in productivity, increase the consumption of a large number of 
agents. In contrast, rulers characterized by lower encompassing interest prefer to keep public 
revenues under their discretion in order to increase their own consumption or “buy” political 
support through targeted transfers to specific groups of agents. According to Olson (1993), 
democratic leaders are usually characterized by a higher encompassing interest, since they are in 
need of a majority of voters that earns a significant share of the market income of the economy. 
This inevitably leads democratic governments to care about the performance of the private market 
and spend more on public inputs that enhance the productivity of the whole economy. In contrast, 
in non-democratic regimes in which rulers focus on a narrower group of supporters, spending on 
benefits like cash transfers can be a more effective way to stay in power. A simple theoretical 
framework along the lines of this argument is provided in the Online Appendix. 
Following a similar rationale, the Selectorate Theory suggests that the size of the winning 
coalition increases as we move from autocratic to democratic regimes, inducing survival-oriented 
leaders to shift policy from targeted private goods (such as cash transfers, business, or export 
licenses) to public goods, in order to please the members of the winning coalition (see, e.g., Bueno 
de Mesquita et al., 2003). This is because democratically elected leaders lack sufficient resources 
to “bribe” all voters of the winning coalition with private goods in order to retain power. This can 
be achieved, though, through public goods that are broadly accessible to voters with inherent 
                                                 
that would ensure a more universal coverage for workers entering the labor market (see e.g. Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). As a 
result of these policies, the size of cash transfers (as a share of GDP) reduced substantially after democratization, although the 
coverage of the pension system became more homogeneous and universal. 
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economies of scale in their supply.28 In contrast, in non-democratic regimes, the ruler depends on 
a much narrower group of supporters (i.e., small winning coalitions), making spending on private 
goods a much more preferable way to buy political support. Finally, along the same lines, Deacon 
(2009) suggests that, in dictatorial regimes in which political influence is more concentrated, a 
rational leader will spend the public budget mainly on transfers targeted to politically influential 
groups. In such an institutional context, spending on a non-exclusive public good is unwise, since 
much of the public good’s benefits will spillover to non-influential outsiders.  
Our results clearly indicate that dictatorial regimes, by relying more heavily on private 
goods such as targeted cash transfers, are more redistributive in comparison to democracies. 
However, a big issue in the relevant empirical literature is whether dictatorships direct these 
targeted transfers to the poorer segments of the society in a manner that reduces income inequality 
or in contrast allocate them to politically powerful elites (the so-called minimum winning 
coalition) enforcing in this way existed income inequality (see e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2015; Ross, 
2006). Obviously, the available macro data fail to illuminate the precise targeting of transfers to 
specific groups of agents. However, we know that a large part of transfers consists of old-age 
pension programs that are directed to the elderly (see. e.g., Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2018), which, 
according to income distribution statistics, belong to the poorer segments of the population, even 
in developed economies (see, e.g., OECD, 2015). Following this rationale, we can infer that 
redistribution, which takes place through targeted cash transfers, is by its nature mostly 
progressive.  
 
4.2 Additional empirical evidence  
Our empirical findings in Section 3 suggest that democracies spend more on public inputs (such 
as health and education), whereas non-democratic regimes rely more heavily on targeted cash 
transfers. Here, we attempt to provide additional evidence that the differences in the pattern of 
government spending are driven by differences in the encompassing interest of the leaders to the 
performance of the private market. First, we explore the effect of the political regime on health 
and education outcomes. Starting from Lucas (1988), a large number of theoretical and empirical 
studies suggest that human capital is one of the main determinants of economic growth. So, if 
                                                 
28 This is because public goods are non-rivalrous (the amount of the good available to be consumed is not diminished by the amount 
of people they consume it) and non-exclusive (once it is provided anyone can enjoy it). In contrast, private goods (such as cash 
transfers, business and export licenses, etc.) benefit some members of the society and not others.  
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democratic rulers are more concerned with the productivity of the whole economy, spending 
should be directed to investments in human capital and consequently to improvements of both 
health and education outcomes. To investigate the effect of political institutions on health 
outcomes, we employ two measures that are broadly employed in the relevant literature, namely 
infant mortality rate and life expectancy at birth. Moreover, to examine if increased spending on 
education is translated to higher levels of human capital, we focus on primary and secondary 
school enrolment rate. Data on health outcomes are obtained from WDI, whereas on education 
from Banks and Wilson (2015) aiming in both cases to maximise data availability. Our findings in 
panel A of Table 7 indicate a positive relationship between political institutions and health and 
education outcomes, which is broadly consistent with the relevant literature (see Brown, 1999; 
Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2018). It should be noted that these estimates rely 
entirely on the static FE specification of equation (2), since in many estimates our GMM 
instruments are proven to be weak.  
 
[Insert Table 7, here] 
 
 Next, to further support the hypothesis that political institutions shape the priority of rulers 
to provide private or public goods, we attempt to measure the extent to which a country is open to 
market forces or in contrast prefers more heavily regulated markets (Gwartney and Lawson, 
2002).29 The rationale is that institutions promoting economic freedoms have been linked 
empirically to increased productivity (see e.g., Dawson, 1998). At the same time, increased market 
regulation generates a wide variety of privileged private goods (such as business licences, 
privileged access to credit etc.) that can be used to gain political support in institutional contexts 
characterized by small winning coalitions (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). To this end, 
we employ the credit market regulations and starting a business indices developed by the EFW 
database. The former quantifies the extent to which countries use a private banking system to 
allocate credit and refrain from controlling interest rates. The latter is designed to measure the 
extent to which regulations and bureaucratic procedures impose barriers to entry and generate 
prospects for rent-seeking activities. Both variables range from 0 to 10, where higher values 
                                                 
29 It should be noted that other databases attempt to measure similar aspects of institutional quality, but we prefer the EFW since it 
provides better coverage. 
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indicate fewer regulations. As can be seen in panel B of Table 7, findings are in line with our 
theoretical priors as well as with a number of previous empirical studies highlighting the positive 
relationship between democratic institutions and economic freedom (see, e.g., De Haan and Sturm, 
2003; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Giuliano et al., 2010). Moreover, our empirical findings 
indicate the tendency of non-democratic regimes to rely more heavily on market regulation so as 




Our analysis examines the relationship between political institutions and effective fiscal 
redistribution, measured by the difference between Gini coefficients before and after taxes and 
transfers. Contrary to expectations, our empirical results suggest that dictatorial regimes are more 
redistributive than democracies. In an attempt to enlighten this puzzling finding, the second step 
of our analysis is to associate political institutions with the size and composition of fiscal policy. 
We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on 
net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (effective 
fiscal redistribution). On the other hand, democratic regimes direct a larger amount of resources 
to public inputs that may influence market income inequality but not the difference between market 
and net inequality per se. The present study suggests that the driving force behind the different 
pattern of government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions 
lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the productivity of the economy, since they are in 
need of a large winning coalition that earns a significant amount of its income in the private 
markets. In contrast, in non-democratic regimes in which the ruler focuses on a narrower group of 
supporters, spending on private goods can be a more effective way to remain in power. 
We note, however, the complexity of investigating the influence of political institutions on 
income redistribution through fiscal policies. Obtained empirical findings call for a deeper 
understanding of the precise mechanisms that create the observed patterns. An advantageous field 
of future research would be to employ more detailed data at the regional level for different 
income/occupational groups of agents in countries that have undergone political transitions. 
Although institutional changes and potential outcomes are more limited than in a cross-country 
setting, by analysing in more depth the targeting of different (fiscal) policies towards regions or 
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Table A1. Definition of variables, data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
fiscal redistribution Difference between the Gini of incomes 
before (market Gini) and after (net 
Gini) taxes and transfers 
828 5.192 5.573 -10.263 34.714 Solt (2009), Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) 
market Gini Gini coefficient before taxes and 
transfers 
775 43.196 9.480 18.775 77.464 SWIID 
dictatorship (CGV) Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 when a political regime is 
characterized as dictatorial and 0 
otherwise 
1250 0.563 0.496 0.000 1.000 Cheibub et al. (2010) 
dictatorship (BMR) Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 when a political regime is 
characterized as dictatorial and 0 
otherwise 
1246 0.562 0.496 0.000 1.000 Boix et al. (2013) 
dictatorship (POLITY2) Index variable that ranges from 0 to 1, 
with higher values indicating more 
authoritarianism 
1240 0.450 0.376 0.000 1.000 Marshall 
and Jaggers (2010) 
democracy abroad (CGV) Measure of regional democratic 
diffusion, based on GGV variable, as 
defined in Subsection 2.4.3 
1258 0.420 0.176 0.043 0.872 Cheibub et al. (2010) 
democracy abroad (BMR) Measure of regional democratic 
diffusion, based on BMR variable, as 
defined in Subsection 2.4.3 
1258 0.421 0.166 0.049 0.870 Boix et al. (2013) 
democracy abroad (POLITY2) Measure of regional democratic 
diffusion, based on POLITY2 index, as 
defined in Subsection 2.4.3 
1258 0.518 0.146 0.113 0.847 Marshall 
and Jaggers (2010) 
total revenues (ICTD) General government total revenues as a 
percentage of GDP 
825 22.524 11.016 1.015 89.078 ICTD Government Revenue Dataset 
(ICTD) 
tax revenues (ICTD) General government tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP  
846 16.051 8.590 0.487 54.475 ICTD 
total revenues (GDNGD) Central government total revenues as a 
percentage of GDP 
475 25.566 10.935 1.785 77.397 Global Development Network Growth 
Database (GDNGD) 
tax revenues (GDNGD) Central government tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP 
476 20.707 9.775 0.833 47.326 GDNGD 
social services Central government social security and 
welfare affairs and services in cash and 
in kind as a percentage of GDP 
434 10.927 9.289 0.000 40.292 GDNGD 
subsides and transfers General government subsidies and 
social benefits in cash and in kind as a 
percentage of GDP 
794 9.186 8.259 0.000 37.200 Economic Freedom of the World 
(EFW) 
cash transfers Central government cash transfer 
payments to households and non-profit 
institutions as a percentage of GDP 
221 9.745 7.962 0.000 30.428 GDNGD 
health and education Central government health and 
education expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP 
410 5.420 2.784 0.357 16.651 GDNGD 
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita 1272 8.293 1.255 4.889 13.264 Penn World tables 8.0 (PWT) 
age dependency Population younger than 15 years or 
older than 64 as a percentage of 
working age population 
1454 73.647 19.303 28.615 120.595 World Banks’ World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
openness International trade volume as a 
percentage of GDP 
1141 68.215 45.596 4.983 430.358 WDI 
infant mortality Infant mortality rate per 1000 live 
births 
1340 55.476 47.172 2.200 260.700 WDI 
life expectancy Life expectancy at birth (years) 1454 63.313 11.312 23.885 82.843 WDI 
primary and secondary enrolment Primary and secondary school 
enrolment per capita 
1278 17.799 5.939 1.580 36.610 Banks and Wilson (2015) 
credit market regulations Index that measures the extent to which 
countries use a private banking system 
to allocate credit to private parties and 
refrain from controlling interest rates. 
Higher values indicate fewer 
regulations. 
959 6.790 2.645 0.000 10.000 EFW 
starting a business Index that measures the extent to which 
regulations and bureaucratic procedures 
restrain entry and reduce competition. 
Higher values indicate fewer 
regulations. 
410 7.834 1.768 0.000 9.964 EFW 
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Table 1. Overview of empirical studies of the relationship between democracy and fiscal policy 
Study Influence on Political variable(s) Period Sample Method Basic Findings 
Acemoglu et al. (2015) Tax revenues (% GDP)  Dichotomous measure of 
democracy  
1960-2010 128 countries Fixed effects OLS 
panel estimates 
Positive and significant effect of 
democracy on tax revenues 
Aidt et al. (2006)  Government spending (% GDP) 
 Spending on defines, general 
administration, the judiciary and 
the police (% GDP) 
 Spending on economic services, 
transportation and 
communication (% GDP) 
 Spending on health, public 
housing, education and social 
security (% GDP) 
 Economic franchise (the size 
of the electorate in 
percentage of its reference 
age group) 
 Female franchise (dummy 
variable that equals 1 after 
women enfranchisement and 
equals 0 otherwise) 
 
1830-1938 12 European 
countries 
Fixed effects OLS 
panel estimates 
Extension of the franchise 
exhibits a positive association 
with total government spending 
mainly by increasing spending 
on infrastructure and internal 
security. Female suffrage 
exhibits a weak positive 
association with spending on 
health, education and welfare 
Aidt and Jensen (2009a) Probability of adopting the income tax Suffrage (percentage of adult 
males who could vote) 
1815-1939 17 countries Logit and 2SLS panel 
estimates 
Extension of the franchise at first 
reduced the probability of 
adoption of the income tax, but 
eventually as universal suffrage 
was approached increased the 
likelihood 
Aidt and Jensen (2009b)  Government spending/taxes (% 
GDP) 
 Direct taxes (% tax revenues) 
 Revenues from customs (% tax 
revenues) 
 Market taxes (% tax revenues) 
Suffrage (percentage of adult 
males who could vote) 
1860-1938 10 European 
countries 
Fixed effects OLS 
and 2SLS panel 
estimates 
Extension of the franchise 
exhibits a positive association 
with total government spending 
and taxation. Moreover, the 
share of direct taxes is positively 
affected by franchise extension 
but only when tax collection 
costs are below a given threshold 
Aidt and Jensen (2013)  Government revenue/spending 
per capita 
Suffrage (percentage of adult 
males who could vote) 
1820-1913 9 European 
countries 
Fixed effects OLS 
and 2SLS panel 
estimates 
Franchise extension exhibits a 
U-shaped association with 
revenue per capita and a positive 
association with spending per 
capita 
Ansell (2010)  Spending on education (% 
GDP/% spending) 
 
Polity index 1960-2000 110 countries Fixed effects OLS 
panel estimates 
Positive and significant 
association between democracy 
and education spending 
Boix (2003)  Government revenues (% GDP) 
 Government consumption (% GDP) 
 Total expenditure (% GDP) 
 Subsidies and transfers (% GDP) 
 Wages and salaries (%GDP) 
 Dichotomous measure of 
democracy  
 Level of turnout 
1950-1999 65 countries  Fixed effects OLS 
panel estimates  
Positive association between 
democratic regime and the size 
of the public sector and social 
spending, though conditional on 
the level of development 
Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo (2001) 
 Spending on social security (per 
capita/% GDP/% spending) 
 Spending on health and 
education (per capita/% GDP/% 
spending) 
Dichotomous measure of 
democracy  





Democracy is positively 
correlated with government 
expenditure on health and 
education, but negatively with 
spending on social security 
Lindert (1994)  Spending on social transfers (% 
GNP) 
 Dichotomous measure of 
democracy  
1880-1930 21 countries Tobit panel estimates Positive association between 
women vote and voter turnout 
with social spending 
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 Spending on welfare and 
unemployment (% GNP) 
 spending on health (% GNP) 
 Spending on pensions (% GNP) 
 Female franchise dummy 
 Voter turnout rate 
 Executive turnover (the 
number of times the chief 
executive post was 
relinquished to someone 
not dependent on the 
incumbent) 
Mulligan et al. (2004)  Government consumption (% 
GDP) 
 Spending on education (% GDP) 
 Spending on social security (% 
GDP) 
 Total revenue (% GDP) 
 Corporate tax rate 
 Personal income tax flatness 
(ratio of the economy-wide 
average income tax rate to the 
top marginal income tax rate) 
 Payroll tax capped 
Democracy index (0-1, a value 
of 1 identifies the maximum 
level of democracy) 
1960-1990 131 countries OLS cross-section 
estimates 
Some evidence that democratic 
countries tend to have “flatter” 
income taxes 
Mulligan et al. (2010)  Spending on social security (% 
GDP) 
 Social security benefit formulas 
 Payroll taxation 
Democracy index (0-1, a value 
of 1 identifies the maximum 
level of democracy) 
1960-1990 90 countries OLS cross-section 
estimates 
If anything the democracy index 
is negatively associated with 
social security spending. 
Moreover, it is positively 
associated with higher payroll 
taxation (and especially with the 
payroll tax burdens paid by the 
employees). 
Profeta et al. (2013)  Tax revenue (% GDP) 
 Personal/Corporate income taxes 
(% GDP) 
 Direct/Indirect/Property/Trade 
taxes (% GDP) 
 Social security contributions (% 
GDP) 
 Government spending (% GDP) 
 General public services (% GDP) 
 Defence/Health/Education/Social 
protection/Public order spending 
(% GDP) 
 Polity index 
 Civil liberties index 
 
1990-2005 38 developing 





Fixed effects OLS 
panel estimates 
The strength of democratic 
institutions and the protection of 
civil liberties are not 
significantly correlated with tax 
revenues and tax composition. A 
similar result applies to public 
spending. 
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Table 2. Political regime and fiscal redistribution: baseline results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FE FE FE FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
Political variable: CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV CGV BMR BMR POLITY2 POLITY2 
dictatorship 1.311*** 1.617*** 2.538*** 1.016*** 0.982*** 1.079*** 1.040*** 1.225** 1.126** 
 (0.497) (0.534) (0.867) (0.345) (0.343) (0.351) (0.355) (0.487) (0.542) 
fiscal redistributiont-1    0.477*** 0.502*** 0.474*** 0.500*** 0.474*** 0.502*** 
    (0.067) (0.079) (0.068) (0.082) (0.069) (0.086) 
GDP per capita 1.415*** 1.517*** 1.393*** -0.085 -0.122 -0.039 -0.082 -0.130 -0.171 
 (0.384) (0.384) (0.375) (0.362) (0.376) (0.365) (0.386) (0.369) (0.388) 
age dependency 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
openness 0.011* 0.010* 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
R2 0.094 0.105 0.105 0.367  0.369  0.364  
Observations 743 740 739 652 521 649 519 649 520 
Number of countries 138 137 136 131 122 130 121 129 121 
Number of instruments     49  49  49 
Hansen (p-value)     0.290  0.332  0.291 
AR(2) (p-value)     0.300  0.284  0.328 
Notes: In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. In the GMM estimates the variable fiscal 
redistributiont-1 is instrumented with second and further lags, whereas all other covariates are treated as exogenous. The Hansen 
statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for 
second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered 
by country are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes 








Table 3. Political regime and fiscal redistribution: outliers and income inequality estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE FE FE GMM GMM GMM 
Political variable: CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 
Panel A: Dropping most noisy inequality data     
       
dictatorship 1.337*** 1.503*** 2.519*** 0.629** 0.743** 1.157** 
 (0.465) (0.513) (0.813) (0.320) (0.374) (0.517) 
R2 0.104 0.113 0.118    
Observations 669 666 666 460 458 458 
Number of countries 135 134 134 116 115 115 
Number of instruments    49 49 49 
Hansen (p-value)    0.329 0.375 0.296 
AR(2) (p-value)    0.286 0.272 0.296 
       
Panel B: Dropping Sub-Saharan Africa countries     
       
dictatorship 1.504** 1.884*** 3.031** 1.177** 1.308*** 1.574** 
 (0.690) (0.687) (1.181) (0.476) (0.473) (0.735) 
R2 0.115 0.128 0.129    
Observations 584 581 580 432 430 431 
Number of countries 98 97 96 92 91 91 
Number of instruments    49 49 49 
Hansen (p-value)    0.219 0.275 0.281 
AR(2) (p-value)    0.287 0.264 0.321 
       
Panel C: Reducing sample between 1980 and 2010 
       
dictatorship 1.307** 1.620** 2.626** 0.739** 0.879*** 1.090* 
 (0.653) (0.648) (1.087) (0.318) (0.320) (0.634) 
R2 0.073 0.086 0.084    
Observations 609 606 604 438 436 436 
Number of countries 138 137 136 122 121 121 
Number of instruments    39 39 39 
Hansen (p-value)    0.211 0.223 0.235 
AR(2) (p-value)    0.341 0.325 0.377 
       
Panel D: Dropping Soviet and Soviet satellite countries     
       
dictatorship 1.340** 1.634*** 2.492*** 1.000*** 1.014*** 1.156** 
 (0.530) (0.566) (0.922) (0.366) (0.366) (0.483) 
R2 0.106 0.114 0.113    
Observations 653 653 652 459 459 460 
Number of countries 110 110 109 97 97 97 
Number of instruments    49 49 49 
Hansen (p-value)    0.389 0.383 0.381 
AR(2) (p-value)    0.259 0.247 0.283 
       
Panel E: Testing for outliers      
       
dictatorship 0.716** 0.945** 1.048* 0.808** 0.918** 1.069* 
 (0.313) (0.399) (0.551) (0.333) (0.380) (0.585) 
R2 0.200 0.207 0.198    
Observations 555 558 563 440 438 444 
Number of countries 114 114 114 109 108 109 
Number of instruments    49 49 49 
Hansen (p-value)    0.336 0.338 0.394 
AR(2) (p-value)    0.702 0.582 0.711 
Notes: In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. In Panel A we repeat the estimates of Table 2 after dropping 
10% of the observations that are associated with the higher uncertainty in the inequality data estimates. In Panel B we drop from estimates in 
Table 2 all Sub-Saharan Africa countries, whereas in Panel C we drop the first two decades of our sample. In Panel D we drop from our sample 
Soviet and Soviet satellite countries. Finally, in Panel E we remove countries with standardized residuals above 1.96 or below -1.96. All models 
control for GDP per capita, age dependency and openness, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. In the GMM estimates the 
variable fiscal redistributiont-1 is instrumented with second and further lags, whereas all other covariates are treated as exogenous. The Hansen 
statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The AR (2) is a test for second-order 
serial correlation in the differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported 
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 4. Political regime and fiscal redistribution: market Gini in the set of control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE FE FE GMM GMM GMM 
Political variable: CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 
dictatorship 1.412** 1.693*** 2.493** 1.112*** 1.050*** 1.315** 
 (0.585) (0.600) (0.985) (0.367) (0.360) (0.547) 
fiscal redistributiont-1    0.551*** 0.550*** 0.551*** 
    (0.090) (0.095) (0.097) 
market Gini 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.080*** -0.068 -0.064 -0.067 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
GDP per capita 0.428 0.523 0.380 -0.044 -0.005 -0.079 
 (0.405) (0.408) (0.403) (0.350) (0.358) (0.356) 
age dependency 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
openness -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
R2 0.138 0.149 0.144    
Observations 652 649 649 521 519 520 
Number of countries 131 130 129 122 121 121 
Number of instruments    50 50 50 
Hansen (p-value)    0.305 0.337 0.303 
AR(2) (p-value)    0.296 0.274 0.326 





Table 5. Political regime and fiscal redistribution: 2SLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Political variable: CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 
dictatorship 2.501** 2.673** 2.378 3.517*** 3.821*** 2.729* 
 (1.178) (1.177) (1.659) (1.272) (1.156) (1.590) 
market Gini    0.064** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
    (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) 
GDP per capita 1.346*** 1.511*** 1.245*** 0.341 0.536 0.077 
 (0.432) (0.451) (0.436) (0.516) (0.554) (0.458) 
age dependency 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.094*** 0.106*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
openness 0.007 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
First-Stage Results 
democracy abroad -0.906** -0.268 -0.825** -0.932** -0.436 -0.966** 
 (0.413) (0.376) (0.386) (0.439) (0.464) (0.457) 
dictatorshipt-1 0.280*** 0.307*** 0.320*** 0.282*** 0.301*** 0.304*** 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.056) (0.051) 
       
F-stat 23.556 17.002 24.621 17.791 14.599 21.086 
Overidentification test 0.402 0.151 0.462 0.621 0.159 0.765 
Observations 697 694 692 617 614 615 
No. of Countries 129 128 127 122 121 121 
Notes: In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. 2SLS are estimated using the variable 
democracy abroad and the first lag of the variable dictatorship as instruments. The F-stat is the F statistics for the explanatory 
power of the excluded instruments in first stage regressions, whereas the overidentification test is the p-value of the Hansen J test 
of the validity of the excluded instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include a full set of country and year fixed effects. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * 






 Table 6A. Political regime and fiscal revenues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Political variable: CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 
Fiscal variable: total revenues (ICTD) tax revenues (ICTD) total revenues (GDNGD) tax revenues (GDNGD) 
dictatorship -0.214 0.174 -0.537 -0.313 -0.062 -0.155 0.529 0.444 1.094 0.066 -0.494 -0.056 
 (0.602) (0.517) (0.968) (0.448) (0.431) (0.658) (0.952) (0.894) (1.410) (0.836) (0.761) (1.174) 
GDP per capita 3.561*** 3.546*** 3.668*** 0.463 0.435 0.452 6.538*** 6.538*** 6.504*** 5.163** 5.095** 5.155*** 
 (1.287) (1.289) (1.329) (0.561) (0.561) (0.573) (1.107) (1.117) (1.086) (1.976) (1.984) (1.959) 
age dependency 0.025 0.023 0.026 -0.039 -0.041 -0.040 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.042 0.041 0.042 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
openness 0.026* 0.027* 0.030* 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.063** 0.063** 0.063** 0.030 0.029 0.030 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
R2 0.138 0.137 0.144 0.116 0.115 0.116 0.253 0.253 0.254 0.215 0.216 0.215 
Observations 658 654 651 705 701 698 451 451 451 452 452 452 
Number of countries 133 132 132 133 132 132 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Notes: In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. All models are estimated according to equation (6), taking five year averages for all variables except for the variable dictatorship 
that we use its value at time t of each five-year period (t, t+4) of our sample. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 
5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
 
 
Table 6B. Political regime and fiscal expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Political variable: CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 
Fiscal variable: social services subsidies and transfers cash transfers health and education 
dictatorship -0.607 -0.717 -0.949 0.433 0.630 0.649 1.740 1.900* 5.354** -0.681*** -0.750*** -1.063** 
 (0.972) (0.929) (1.338) (0.564) (0.555) (1.046) (1.215) (1.140) (2.205) (0.246) (0.254) (0.422) 
GDP per capita -0.283 -0.300 -0.180 1.543* 1.642** 1.574* 0.020 0.104 -0.851 -0.479 -0.487 -0.429 
 (1.628) (1.624) (1.591) (0.837) (0.819) (0.830) (1.818) (1.790) (1.586) (0.511) (0.506) (0.525) 
age dependency 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 -0.065 -0.077 -0.108 -0.034* -0.035** -0.033* 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.085) (0.083) (0.087) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
openness -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
R2 0.108 0.110 0.109 0.117 0.118 0.116 0.149 0.163 0.238 0.112 0.118 0.116 
Observations 411 411 411 769 768 768 215 215 215 390 390 390 
Number of countries 101 101 101 127 126 126 80 80 80 99 99 99 
Notes: In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. In columns (1)-(3)and (7)-(12) we estimate equation (6), taking five year averages for all variables except for the variable 
dictatorship that we use its value at time t of each five-year period (t, t+4) of our sample. In columns (4)-(6) that EFW database provides one observation every five years until 2000, we use for the dependent variable 
only the last observation for each subperiod of our sample. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * 
denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 7: Political regime, health-education outcomes and market regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Political variable: CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 CGV BMR POLITY2 
      
Panel A: Political regime and health and education outcomes      
Dependent variable:  infant mortality life expectancy primary and secondary enrolment 
dictatorship 8.985*** 8.293*** 17.295*** -1.328*** -1.178** -2.389*** -1.031* -0.970** -2.332*** 
 (2.408) (2.280) (4.122) (0.427) (0.463) (0.895) (0.556) (0.480) (0.816) 
R2 0.689 0.688 0.696 0.698 0.697 0.700 0.281 0.281 0.288 
Observations 1090 1085 1082 1107 1102 1099 1103 1098 1095 
Number of countries 146 145 145 146 145 145 145 144 144 
          
Panel B: Political regime and market regulations        
    
Dependent variable:  credit market regulations starting a business  
dictatorship -0.501* -0.260 -1.040** -0.342** -0.322* -0.987***    
 (0.262) (0.257) (0.416) (0.146) (0.186) (0.337)    
R2 0.372 0.367 0.375 0.633 0.633 0.637    
Observations 892 890 889 402 400 400    
Number of countries 132 131 131 132 131 131    
Notes: In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. All estimations are based on equation (2). All models control for GDP per capita, age dependency and 
openness, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
